celebrated theorists Bourcet and Guibert, whose thoughts embodied the fundamental notions on warfare that Napoleon was taught as a student, and practically, by the introduction of the division system post Seven Years' War. 12 A revolution in military deployment, divisions separated armies into subunits enhancing their flexibility and granting them far more maneuverability and speed whilst in campaign, an innovation ignored by the remainder of Europe. 13 However, while he did not conceive these operational notions, he did perfect them.
14 Operationally, while Napoleon was defined by the rapidity of his maneuvers and his ability to concentrate his forces to achieve local numerical superiority, his vision centered on the linkage of dispersion and rapid concentration of divisions. 15 At the onset of a campaign, Napoleon would disperse his divisions in a deployment resembling a cordon to grant himself operational flexibility in his choice of target. Upon a selection, the dispersed divisions would rapidly reconcentrate upon a single carefully selected point, maneuvering with rapidity and precision to envelop and annihilate the chosen enemy force. 16 To achieve this end, Napoleon employed three mutually reinforcing operational structures. First, la manoeuvre sur les derrières -An operational maneuver used against a single enemy army. In this case, Napoleon would deploy a small detachment to assault the enemy and pin it in place while maneuvering his main army to turn the flank of the enemy army and from there cut off its retreat. At this point, Napoleon would rapidly advance on the enemy rear forcing them to either surrender or give battle on Napoleon's terms. 17 Second, the strategy of central position-An operational maneuver used when the Chandler, [163] [164] Napoleon would move to gain local numerical superiority by isolating each enemy force and defeating them in detail. To achieve this, Napoleon would locate the "hinge" connecting the enemy forces and immediately concentrate all available forces at this point. 18 Upon seizing this "central position," the French would divide their army into two wings and a reserve. A target would then be selected, and the nearest wing would march to launch a pinning attack against this foe while the reserve maneuvered to outflank it. Simultaneously, the other wing would screen and pin the remaining enemy armies to both prevent an attack on the French rear and to ready the subsequent, identical, operation which would occur on that wing. 19 Third, the strategy of penetration-The introduction to the other two maneuvers, it consisted of smashing through a defensive cordon to seize a center of operations.
20
These operational maneuvers were designed to construct a favorable environment for battle, for which, tactically, there was but one goal, annihilation. As such, all Napoleonic battles were centered on the offensive with the utmost importance placed on achieving an envelopment of the enemy. 21 There were three principal types of Napoleonic battles: 1) the frontal assault, used when necessitated by the geographic environment, 2) the double battle, the strategy of central position writ small, and 3) the strategical battle, Napoleon's favorite. 22 A tactical approach designed to secure an envelopment and destroy the enemy, the strategical battle began with a vanguard moving forward to pin the enemy line. This frontal assault would then draw in the enemy's reserve as ever more French soldiers would commit to the attack. Chandler, [184] [185] [186] been sent to the front line. 23 At which point, the enemy would be forced to extend, and thereby weaken, their formation to prevent encirclement. Ready for this moment, Napoleon would commit his "Masse de décision," a special reserve, to the weakened sector, smashing the enemy line and achieving victory. 24 The combination of these strategic, operational, and tactical elements constitutes Napoleonic warfare. 25 What is striking is that Napoleon had conceived of these detailed frameworks from the onset of his career, as will be shown by his extensive use of these concepts in Italy, wherein he translated theory into practice and demonstrated its deadly effectiveness.
26
The birth of Napoleonic warfare is one portion of the significance of the Italian campaign; the other is the scale of the achievement itself. In response, Beaulieu, with 21,000 remaining soldiers, turned east and retreated across the Po River, establishing a defensive cordon to halt the French from crossing. 41 However, by this time, the Army of Italy's strength had risen to 39,600 men, granting Napoleon the overall numerical superiority and allowing him to implement La manoeuvre sur les derrières.
army for an attack on Wurmser, marching with Massena to reinforce Augereau and recalling Serurier. 55 From the onset, Napoleon intended for this to be a battle of annihilation, and as such, he applied his strategical battle structure. Massena and Augereau were to launch frontal pinning attacks on Wurmser's center-right and center-left, an assault on the Austrian line that, with the aid of a stream of reinforcements, would draw in the Austrian reserve. Then, at the moment when the last reserve was committed, Serurier's division, having maneuvered around the enemy Chandler, 198. not in what was achieved, but instead in its demonstration of the first use of Napoleon's principal battle plan. All of the elements of future victories, of Jena, of Austerlitz, were on full display.
60
The first relief attempt of Mantua had been defeated; Napoleon had managed to concentrate a superior force against each Austrian wing, and in just six days had captured or killed 20,000
Austrians while losing only 7,000 himself, and in so doing demonstrated the future of warfare.
61
After Castiglione, the Austrians would launch three more assaults upon Mantua, each a repeat of their predecessors. A numerically superior Austrian army would divide itself and advance down the paths surrounding Lake Garda, they would then push back the French divisions, at which point Napoleon would concentrate his divisions, gain a central position, and defeat each Austrian detachment in detail. This was the case at Bassano, this was the case at Arcole, and this was the case at Rivoli. 62 By skill in operations and tactics, Napoleon was repeatedly victorious in the face of overwhelming odds. By skill in operations he achieved local supremacy and by skill in tactics he won the ensuing battles. Each successive Austrian attack confirmed Napoleon's ability to maneuver, his ability to concentrate his forces to defeat armies far larger than his own, and his ability to wage what would be called Napoleonic warfare. After Rivoli, Mantua surrendered, and Napoleon pushed on to Austria. From here, Napoleon quickly overwhelmed the Archduke Charles and opened the path to Vienna, thereby ending the war.
63
For France, this was a momentous victory that not only marked the end of the long 
